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Research on children’s developing moral cognition has mostly focused on their
evaluation of, and reasoning about, others’ intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal actions
(e.g., hitting, lying). But assertions may have morally relevant (intended or unintended)
consequences, too. For instance, if someone wrongly claims that “This water is clean!,”
such an incorrect representation of reality may have harmful consequences to others.
In two experiments, we investigated preschoolers’ evaluation of others’ morally relevant
factual claims. In Experiment 1, children witnessed a puppet making incorrect assertions
that would lead to harm or to no harm. In Experiment 2, incorrect assertions would
always lead to harm, but the puppet either intended the harm to occur or not. Children
evaluated the puppet’s factual claim more negatively when they anticipated harmful
versus harmless consequences (Experiment 1) and when the puppet’s intention was
bad versus good over and above harmful consequences (Experiment 2). These findings
suggest that preschoolers’ normative understanding is not limited to evaluating others’
intrinsically harmful transgressions but also entails an appreciation of the morally relevant
consequences of, and intentions underlying, others’ factual claims.
Keywords: factual claims, normativity, norm psychology, social-cognitive development, assertive speech acts,
moral cognition
People make assertions about the world every day. Many of these (e.g., “The sun is smaller than
the earth.”) are typically orthogonal to moral issues and can simply be accepted or rejected given
observable reality or some piece of evidence. Others may be morally relevant for a speaker intends
to (interpersonally) deceive an addressee (e.g., lying). But sometimes, even simple factual claims –
which we keep distinct from the term “lying” – (e.g., “This water is clean!”) may become morally
relevant, in that they may have harmful consequences (e.g., influence others to act in harmful
ways). What is more, speakers may even use factual claims that are easily refutable (e.g., simple
generalizations, or claims like “This project was not a success!,” “The Earth is flat!”) not so much
to deceive others, but rather as a means to bring about certain (harmful) consequences (e.g., instill
conflict, uncertainty). That is, factual claims may have a moral dimension over and above questions
of deceptive intent, truthfulness (i.e., whether the speaker believes the claim or not), or intrinsic
harmfulness (e.g., insults). Perhaps especially in the digital age of today in which we face all kinds
of assertions that may be associated with certain (intended or unintended) consequences, it seems
vital to assess children’s understanding of the moral relevance of simple factual claims. In the
present study, we investigate preschoolers’ understanding of the moral dimension of others’ factual
claims with a focus on harmful consequences on the one hand, and harmful intentions (regarding
harmful consequences) on the other.
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CHILDREN’S EVALUATION OF OTHERS’
MORAL TRANSGRESSIONS
Developmental research over the past couple of decades has
accumulated much evidence that preschoolers and, to some
extent, even very young children understand much about the
moral dimension of others’ actions (Turiel, 2006; Schmidt and
Tomasello, 2012; Hamlin, 2013; Killen and Smetana, 2015;
Rottman and Young, 2015; Sommerville and Enright, 2018).
Most prominently, a bulk of interview studies based on social
domain theory suggests that preschoolers reliably differentiate
between moral norms (e.g., norms forbidding violent behavior,
such as hitting) and conventional norms (e.g., norms prescribing
appropriate clothing, such as not wearing pajamas to school),
judging that – compared with conventional violations – moral
transgressions are more severe, more deserving of punishment,
more widely applicable and independent of authority demands
(Turiel, 2006; Smetana et al., 2014; Killen and Smetana, 2015).
Another line of research focused on children’s disinterested
enforcement of norms in social interactions and found that
from around 3 years of age, children spontaneously protest
and criticize agents who violate conventional norms, such as
(agreed-upon) simple game rules (Rakoczy, 2008; Rakoczy et al.,
2008; Schmidt et al., 2016), and agents who commit moral
transgressions, such as violating others’ rights or harming others
(Rossano et al., 2011; Vaish et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2012, 2013).
And from around 3 to 5 years of age, children do not just
reject and negatively evaluate harmful physical actions but also
show some understanding of intrinsically harmful verbal actions
that produce psychological harm (typically given the content
of the speech act), such as name-calling or teasing (Helwig
et al., 2001; Smetana et al., 2012; Ball et al., 2017), or “epistemic
harm” (given the speaker’s deceptive intent to instill a false belief
in the listener), such as lying and deceiving (Peterson et al.,
1983; Bussey, 1999; Lyon et al., 2013). Together, these studies
using different methodologies equally suggest that at preschool
age, children understand much about the moral dimension of
intrinsically harmful non-verbal and verbal actions.
CHILDREN’S EVALUATION OF OTHERS’
ASSERTIONS
While there is much evidence that preschoolers understand the
moral dimension of others’ intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal
actions (e.g., hitting, stealing, lying), there is, to our knowledge,
no research on their understanding (in terms of normative
evaluation) of the moral dimension of others’ factual claims
that become morally relevant not because of their deceptive
motivation, but because of the harmful consequences – intended
or not – they may entail. Past work has focused on whether
children, or even infants, categorize others’ speech acts as correct
or incorrect or, at minimum, as statistically expectable or not.
For instance, research has shown that even infants are sensitive
to whether a speaker labels an object correctly (Koenig and
Echols, 2003). And 2-year-olds spontaneously reject assertions
that do not match reality (e.g., “Peter is eating the cake” when
Peter instead is eating a carrot; Pea, 1982). Moreover, 3-year-olds
understand that imperative speech acts should lead to a change
of reality (e.g., a person should follow an imperative), whereas
assertive speech acts should describe the present reality correctly
(Rakoczy and Tomasello, 2009). At the same age, children can
identify persons that say something correct or say something
wrong and distinguish correct from incorrect statements (Koenig
et al., 2004; Lyon et al., 2013).
INVESTIGATING CHILDREN’S
UNDERSTANDING OF THE MORAL
DIMENSION OF FACTUAL CLAIMS
Some assertions, such as (malicious) lies, may be considered
intrinsically harmful as they are morally relevant regardless of
their consequences (Turiel, 1983; Lee, 2013). That is, even if a lie
is not effective or does not produce major harm, we may find the
mere act of lying, the deceptive intent, blameworthy. However,
there is also a more extrinsic component of moral relevance to
assertions, namely, the potentially harmful consequences they
may entail. For instance, factual claims, such as “This water
is clean!,” may simply be false given observable reality. Thus,
one may easily refute them. However, they may also bring
about harmful consequences beyond questions of truthfulness or
deception (e.g., someone might get sick by drinking dirty water).
Thus, we can morally evaluate assertions for their consequences
just like physical actions (Cushman, 2008). Moreover, we may
have information about whether the speaker intends harmful
consequences to occur or not. Importantly, the speaker may
not even have deceptive intent or believe the claim to be
false, but rather use the speech act to bring about harmful
consequences. Thus, we may also morally evaluate assertions for
the intentionality of their consequences.
Hence, here we are interested in two major questions
concerning children’s understanding of the moral dimension
of factual claims: (i) how do children evaluate assertions that
lead to harmful consequences? And (ii) does it matter for
children’s moral evaluation whether the harmful consequences
were intended by the speaker or not? Evaluating morally relevant
assertions is more complex than evaluating morally relevant
actions. Regarding the former, the child can directly assess
someone’s action considering moral norms or principles (e.g.,
“Hitting is wrong!”). Regarding the latter, however, the child
needs to infer that a factual claim (e.g., “This is an X!”) – which,
per se, could be considered amoral in that it merely corresponds
to reality or not (Turri, 2017) – may lead to harmful consequences
and that those consequences may be intended or not. Hence, the
crux is to evaluate the assertion as good or bad not in light of its
correspondence to reality, but regarding the moral relevance of its
consequences and the intentionality of those consequences.
Ever since Piaget’s (1932) seminal work, researchers were
interested in whether children put more weight on the
consequences of an agent’s morally relevant action or on the
agent’s mental states, such as intention, when evaluating the
moral valence of an act. While Piaget was clear that children
begin with outcome-based evaluations and only later consider
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others’ intentions in their moral evaluation, more recent research
produced heterogeneous results. Whereas some researchers
suggest that even school-aged children tend to give more weight
to outcomes than to intentions (Costanzo et al., 1973; Yuill,
1984; Zelazo et al., 1996; Helwig et al., 2001; Cushman et al.,
2013; Gummerum and Chu, 2014), others found that when using
simplified procedures (e.g., simpler vignettes) or controlling for
confounding factors (e.g., the action of the well-intended and
the ill-intended actors led to the same outcome), even 4- to 5-
year-old (and in some work, even 3-year-old) children consider
an agent’s intention (Chandler et al., 1973; Nelson, 1980; Baird
and Astington, 2004; Nobes et al., 2009, 2016; Vaish et al.,
2010; Killen et al., 2011; Gvozdic et al., 2016). A recent study
(Josephs et al., 2016) demonstrated that 4-year-old (and to some
extent even 3-year-old) children take into account an agent’s
intentionality (freedom of choice) and protested more when a
moral transgression occurred under free conditions than if it
occurred under constrained ones. For conventional violations,
however, children tended to put more weight on outcomes.
When evaluating others’ morally relevant factual claims,
children thus need to coordinate both consequences (e.g.,
harmful vs. harmless) and intentions (e.g., good vs. bad)
regarding consequences. For intentions, in particular, children
are required to use both their normativity and theory of
mind skills (Perner et al., 1989; Killen and Smetana, 2008;
Killen and Rizzo, 2014; Schmidt and Rakoczy, 2018).When it
comes to explicitly evaluating others’ morally relevant actions,
children begin to consider the importance of intentions by
around 4 to 5 years of age (Nelson, 1980; Nobes et al., 2016),
which coincides with children’s becoming competent at false
belief tasks (Perner and Roessler, 2012). Recently, Killen and
colleagues (2011) investigated 3.5- to 7.5-year-old children’s
understanding of intentions in a morally relevant context –
morally relevant theory of mind (MoToM). In MoTom tasks,
children receive vignettes in which a “transgressor” accidentally
causes harm to another person (e.g., accidentally throws a
bag with another person’s cupcake away). Children who failed
classical false belief tasks were more likely to attribute bad
intentions to an accidental transgressor and to accept punishment
of the accidental transgressor than children who passed the
false belief task. Overall, children began to take into account
the transgressor’s intention between 3.5 and 5.5 years of
age.
THE PRESENT STUDY
In the current study, therefore, we are interested in speech
acts that are in and of themselves amoral (i.e., they are simply
correct or incorrect and not deceptive), but come with moral
relevance, either in terms of anticipated consequences or in
terms of the intentionality of those consequences. We sought
to investigate in two experiments whether 4- to 5-year-old
children understand the moral dimension of factual claims and
evaluate and reason about such claims in terms of morally
relevant consequences (Experiment 1) or the intentionality of
morally relevant consequences (Experiment 2). Importantly, to
investigate children’s evaluation of assertions, and not of (non-
verbal) actions, one needs to make sure that children only
witness a speaker making an assertion, but not performing an
action (which could be directly assessed without referring to the
speaker’s assertion). Moreover, to exclude the moral evaluation
of epistemic harm (e.g., deceptive intent) and psychological
harm (e.g., teasing), it is crucial to use assertions that can
easily be rejected given observable reality, and that do not
have a specific addressee (that might be deceived or insulted).
In Experiment 1, therefore, a puppet made simple incorrect
factual claims (e.g., “This is an X!,” although it was a Y) and
children were told that this incorrect claim would either lead
to harm (another puppet would lose her property) or to no
harm (a paper ball would be thrown away). In Experiment 2,
incorrect claims would always lead to harm, but the puppet either
intended the harmful consequences (bad intention) or not (good
intention). We predicted that preschoolers would evaluate the
incorrect factual claim more negatively (i) when it would lead
to harm than when it would not cause any harm (Experiment
1), and (ii) when it was based on a bad intention than when
its underlying intention was good (Experiment 2). Moreover, we
predicted that children who differentiate correctly between the
two types of incorrect factual claims in both experiments would
be more likely to provide adequate justifications (referring to
consequences in Experiment 1, and to intentions in Experiment
2) for their differential evaluation than children who did
not differentiate between the two types of incorrect factual
claims.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we sought to investigate how children evaluate
and justify their evaluation about others’ morally relevant factual
claims. We manipulated the consequences of the incorrect claim:
it would either lead to harm or to no harm.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four (51–69 months; M = 5 years, 0 months; 12 girls)
preschoolers participated in the study. Children came from
mixed socio-economic backgrounds from a large German
city and were recruited via urban daycare centers (in which
testing took place). Parents provided written informed
consent. One additional child was tested but excluded due
to uncooperativeness.
Design
In a within-participants design, all children received a factual
claim task with two conditions: a puppet made an incorrect claim
that would either lead to harm (harm condition) and to no harm
(no harm condition). The factual claim task was preceded by a
warm-up session (playing with a ball) and a training phase which
consisted of two instrumental warm-up tasks (one harm, one no
harm condition). The order of condition was counterbalanced
between children.
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Procedure
Two experimenters conducted the study, which lasted roughly
10 minutes: E1, the coordinator, and E2, who operated two
puppets (an elephant named “Susi” and an owl named “Lore”).
The child, E1, and E2 sat at a table. E1 sat to the child’s left, and
E2 on the child’s right. The factual claim task was preceded by
a training phase with two warm-up tasks to make sure children
understood the consequences of an incorrect behavior that led
either to harm or to no harm.
Training phase
In the harm condition, E1 first showed the child and the puppets
five stickers and put them in front of the owl (“Look Lore, these
are your stickers. These are yours. Look [referring to the child]
these are Lore’s stickers and Lore really likes these stickers.”). The
owl confirmed this by saying, “Yes, I really like these stickers! And
if my stickers are gone, I will be very sad!” and subsequently said
goodbye and went to sleep. First, the experimenter performed an
instrumental action that the child could reproduce (e.g., using a
hammer to hit on wooden balls to send them through holes of a
cuboid). After that she put a box on the table asking the child to
pay attention (“And now pay attention to what Susi will do! But
Susi must not do anything wrong! If Susi does something wrong,
I will take away all of Lore’s stickers and put them in this box
and then Lore is very sad!”). In the no harm condition, there was
only the elephant present and instead of stickers, a paper ball was
the object of interest. The experimenter showed the child another
instrumental action that the child could reproduce (e.g., putting a
disc on a peg). Thereafter, the experimenter put a box on the table
asking the child to pay attention (“And now pay attention to what
Susi will do! But Susi must not do anything wrong! If Susi does
something wrong, I will take this paper and put it in this box and
then no one is sad!”). In the test phase of both the harm and the
no harm conditions, the elephant made an instrumental mistake
by failing to use a conventional means necessary to achieve an
aim (e.g., failing to use the hammer). When the experimenter
turned back she asked the child two control questions, “Did Susi
do it right or wrong?” and “What will I do with these stickers/the
paper?” Depending on the child’s answer, the experimenter either
confirmed the child’s answer or she corrected him/her, and as
announced, the experimenter put the stickers/paper in the box
on the table. After answering the control questions, the child was
asked to evaluate the elephant’s action for its moral valence on a
four-point Likert scale with smiley faces as anchor (“Susi did it
wrong. Is this very bad [German: “schlecht”], a little bad, good or
very good.”) and was asked to justify his/her evaluation.
Factual claim task
The important difference between the factual claim task and
the warm-up tasks in the training phase was that instead of
evaluating instrumental actions the child was asked to evaluate
factual claims for their moral valence and the child did not see
the announced consequences, but had to anticipate them. The
setup was similar to the one in the training phase but differed
in two ways: in the harm condition, the stickers were replaced by
gems and in both conditions, objects were used instead of toys.
In the introduction phase, the owl again declared that she likes
her gems very much and would be very sad if her gems would
be gone and subsequently went to sleep. Then, the experimenter
put an object (e.g., a spoon) and a box on the table and asked
the child to pay attention to what the elephant was going to say
“And now pay attention to what Susi will say. But Susi must not
say anything wrong! If Susi says something wrong, I will take
away all of Lore’s gems and put them in this box and then Lore
is very sad.” (harm condition), or “If Susi is saying something
wrong, I will take this paper and put it in this box and then no
one is sad!” (no harm condition). When the experimenter had
turned around, the elephant thought aloud: “Well, when I am
saying something wrong, [experimenter’s name] will take away
all of Lore’s gems and put them in this box and then Lore is very
sad.” (harm condition), or “Well, when I am saying something
wrong, [experimenter’s name] will take this paper and put it in
this box and then no one is sad!” (no harm condition).
In the test phase of both conditions, the elephant pointed
to the object (e.g., spoon) and made an incorrect claim: “I say
this is an X (e.g., cat).” The experimenter then turned back and
corrected the elephant saying, “This is an Y, not an X!” The child
was then asked to evaluate the elephant’s speech act for its moral
valence on a four-point Likert scale with smiley faces as anchor
(“Susi said it wrong. Is this very bad, a little bad, good or very
good?”) and to justify his/her evaluation.
Coding and Reliability
All sessions were transcribed and coded from videotape by a
single observer. A second independent observer, blind to the
hypotheses and conditions of the study, transcribed and coded
a random sample of 25% of all sessions for reliability.
Children’s answers to the control questions (dichotomous
variable: correct or incorrect response to E1’s questions), their
evaluation on the Likert scale – from 1 (very good) to 4
(very bad) – and the justification of their evaluation were
coded. Children’s verbal responses were assigned to the following
categories (the first and third categories were determined a priori;
see also Nobes et al., 2009): (a) references to consequences (e.g.,
“Because now all gems are gone.”; “Because now no one is
sad.”); (b) references to the elephant’s actions and speech acts
(e.g., “Because she did it wrong.,” “Because it is not a cat.”); (c)
references to the elephant’s intentions (e.g., “Because she [the
elephant] wants to have the stickers.”); (d) irrelevant justifications
(e.g., “Because the gems are so beautiful.”); or (e) no justifications
(including “Don’t know”).
Interrater reliability was very good, Cohen’s κ = 1 (both
answers to the control question 1 and 2), κ = 1 (warm-up task
evaluation), κ = 1 (warm-up task justification), κ = 1 (factual
claim task evaluation), and κ = 1 (factual claim task justification).
Statistical Analysis
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.4.2 (R Core Team,
2016). For the measure evaluation of the action in the warm-up
and the speech act in the factual claim task, we used non-
parametric statistics (Wilcoxon Z-tests) instead of paired sample
t-tests, because errors were not normally distributed. For non-
parametric tests, we computed the generic effect size r.
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In the factual claim task, children evaluated the puppet’s speech
act significantly more negative when the speech act would lead
to harm (M = 3.29, SD = 0.75) than when it would lead to no
harm (M = 2.54, SD = 1.06; Z = −2.360, p = 0.018, r = 0.481).
Figure 1 shows the mean score of children’s evaluation of the
puppet’s speech act.
Justifications
Children also had the opportunity to justify their evaluation.
Table 1 shows the frequencies of children’s justifications.
Relation between evaluation and justifications
For the purposes of analyses, children were categorized as
“competent” (i.e., children who evaluated the puppet’s speech act
that would lead to harm more negatively than the speech act
that would lead to no harm) and “other” (i.e., the rest of the
sample). There were significant associations between children’s
justifications and their competence in evaluating the moral
valence of the puppet’s speech act both when it would lead to
harm, χ2 (2, N = 24) = 6.45, p = 0.011, V = 0.42 and to no harm,
χ2 (2, N = 24) = 4, p = 0.045, V = 0.31 (see Table 2), such that
competent children were more likely to justify their evaluation
referring to the consequences of the speech act (rather than using
other types of justification) than other children.
Warm-Up Task
Children answered two control questions in the warm-up tasks
to make sure they understood the consequences of a wrong
action. In the harm condition, one child (4%), and in the no
harm condition, two children (8%) gave incorrect answers to the
first control question (“Did Lore do it right or wrong?,” correct
answer was “wrong”). In the harm condition, no child, and in
the no harm condition, two children (8%) gave an incorrect
answer to the second control question (“And what will I do with
the stickers/paper?,” correct answer was “You put them/it in the
box.”).
Evaluation
In the warm-up tasks, children evaluated the wrong behavior
significantly more negative when the action led to harm
(M = 3.38, SD = 0.65) than when it led to no harm (M = 2.71,
SD = 1; Z =−2.495, p = 0.011, r = 0.509).
Justifications
See Table 1 for the frequencies of children’s justifications.
Relation between evaluation and justifications
There was no significant association between children’s
justifications and their competence in evaluating the moral
valence of the puppet’s action that led to harm, χ2 (2,
N = 24) = 1.74, p = 0.587, V = 0.27 (see Table 2). However, there
was a significant association between children’s justifications and
their competence in evaluating the moral valence of the puppet’s
action that led to no harm, χ2 (2, N = 24) = 5.71, p = 0.016,
V = 0.36, such that competent children were more likely to justify
their evaluation referring to the consequences of the action
(rather than using other types of justification) than the other
children.
Discussion
Children in this experiment evaluated the puppet’s factual
claim act more negatively when it would lead to harmful
consequences than when it would lead to no harm. Moreover,
those children who evaluated the puppet’s assertions competently
(i.e., evaluating the harm-related assertion as worse than the
no harm-related assertion) were more likely to justify their
evaluation referring to the consequences of the factual claim than
to give irrelevant or no justification, whereas the other children
(i.e., those who did not differentiate between the two types of
factual claims or gave a more negative evaluation of the no
harm-related assertion) were more likely to refer to the incorrect
factual claim itself, to give an irrelevant answer or no justification.
This suggests that preschoolers’ normative understanding goes
beyond evaluating others’ intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal
actions (e.g., hitting, lying), and also entails an appreciation
of the moral consequences of others’ assertive speech acts.
However, this experiment leaves open the question of whether
children appreciate morally relevant intentions underlying
others’ assertive speech acts when controlling for outcome. Thus,
to assess this question, we conducted a second experiment
in which consequences would always be harmful and either
intended by a puppet (bad intention) or not (good intention).
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, in contrast to Experiment 1, incorrect factual
claims always would lead to harm. However, the puppet either
intended those harmful consequences or not. Findings from
different studies suggest that when confronted with vignettes
about different types of transgressions, children can differentiate
between acts based on good and acts based on bad intentions
from around 4 to 5 years of age (Núñez and Harris, 1998; Nobes
et al., 2016, 2009). Furthermore, Killen et al. (2011) found that
children began to take into account a transgressor’s intention
between 3.5 and 5.5 years, such that children who passed classical
false belief tasks were more likely to attribute good intentions
to an accidental transgressor and to decline punishment of the
accidental transgressor than children who failed the false belief
task. Importantly, we went beyond prior work and did not
investigate whether children consider intentions when evaluating
intrinsically harmful non-verbal actions (e.g., physical harm, such
as breaking cups or hurting another person accidentally or
intentionally) or verbal actions (e.g., lying), but rather whether
children consider whether a puppet intends harm to occur when
evaluating her speech act. If they do, children should evaluate
the well-intended puppet’s incorrect factual claim more positively
than the ill-intended puppet’s incorrect factual claim.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four (48–71 months; M = 5 years, 0 months; 12 girls)
preschoolers participated in the study. Children came from
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FIGURE 1 | Mean score of children’s evaluation (from 0 = very good to 4 = very bad). Error bars depict standard error of the mean.
TABLE 1 | Frequencies (percentage) of justifications.
Task
Category Warm-up Factual claim
Harm No harm Harm No harm
Consequences 6 (25%) 3 (12.5%) 7 (29%) 6 (25%)
Action/speech act 10 (42%) 12 (50%) 11 (46%) 10 (42%)
Intentions 1 (4%) 0 0 0
Others 2 (8%) 3 (12.5%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%)
No answer 5 (21%) 6 (25%) 4 (17%) 6 (25%)
TABLE 2 | Association between evaluation and justification.
Justification category
Task Condition Intentions Consequences Others
Factual claim Harm Evaluation Others 0 2 14
Competent 0 5 3
No harm Evaluation Others 0 2 14
Competent 0 4 4
Warm-up Harm Evaluation Others 0 4 11
Competent 1 2 6
No harm Evaluation Others 0 0 15
Competent 0 3 6
mixed socio-economic backgrounds from a large German city
and were recruited via urban daycare centers and a museum
(in which testing took place). Parents provided written informed
consent. One additional child was tested but excluded due to
language difficulties.
Design
In a within-participants design, all children received a factual
claim task in which a puppet made an incorrect assertion
that would always lead to harm. The task had two conditions
which differed in that the puppet’s intention was either good
or bad (good-intention condition and bad-intention condition).
The factual claim task was preceded by a warm-up session
(playing with a ball) and warm-up tasks which consisted of two
instrumental tasks. A forced choice task always came last. The
order of condition was counterbalanced between children. The
order of the puppets’ appearance remained the same (elephant,
dog, lion, and seal).
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Procedure
Two experimenters conducted the study, which lasted roughly
15 minutes: E1, the coordinator, and E2, who operated the victim
(an owl puppet), the two actor puppets (an elephant and a dog)
and the two speaker puppets (a lion and a seal). Each puppet was
used in one trial only. The child, E1, and E2 sat at a table. E1 sat
to the child’s left, and E2 sat vis-à-vis to the child (thus the child
faced the puppets).
The factual claim task was preceded by a training phase,
consisting of two warm-up tasks to make sure children
understood the consequences of an incorrect behavior that was
based on good or bad intentions.
Training phase
E1 first showed the child and the two puppets (e.g., owl and
elephant) five stickers and put them in front of the owl (“Look
owl, these are your stickers. These are yours. Look [referring to
the child] these are the owl’s stickers and she really likes these
stickers.”). The owl confirmed this by saying “Yes, I really like
these stickers! And if my stickers are gone, I am very sad!”
and subsequently said goodbye and went to sleep. First, the
experimenter performed an instrumental action that the child
could reproduce (e.g., using a hammer to hit on wooden balls to
send them through holes of a cuboid). After that she put a box in
front of the elephant, and asked the child to pay attention (“And
now pay attention to what the elephant will do! But he must not
do anything wrong! If he does something wrong, I will take away
all of the owl’s stickers and put them in the elephant’s box and
then the owl is very sad!”). When the experimenter had turned
around, the elephant repeated: “Well, if I do something wrong,
[experimenter’s name] will take away all of the owl’s stickers and
put them in my box, and then the owl is very sad.” In the bad
intention condition, he announced: “The owl should not keep the
stickers. I want those stickers. That’s why I want to do something
wrong.,” while announcing in the good intention condition: “The
owl should keep the stickers. I do not want those stickers. That’s
why I want to do something right.”
In the test phase, in both the good and the bad intention
conditions, the elephant made an instrumental mistake, by failing
to use a conventional means necessary to achieve an aim (e.g.,
failing to use the hammer). When the experimenter turned back,
she asked the child “Did he do it right or wrong?” and “What will
I do with these stickers?” Depending on the child’s answer, the
experimenter either confirmed the child’s answer or she corrected
him/her, and as announced, the experimenter put the stickers in
the other puppet’s box. After answering the control questions, the
child had to evaluate the elephant’s action for its moral valence on
a Likert scale (“The elephant did it wrong. Is this mean [German
“böse”], a little mean, good or very good of him?”) and was asked
to justify his/her evaluation. Note that we used the German word
“böse” to allow children to focus on intentions and not only
on the fact that harm occurred or even that the speech act was
incorrect.
Factual claim task
The important difference between the warm-up task and the
factual claim task was that instead of evaluating an instrumental
action the child had to evaluate factual claims for their moral
valence, and the child did not see the announced consequences,
but had to anticipate them. The setup was similar to the one
in the warm-up task and differed only in two ways: the stickers
were replaced by gems and in both conditions, objects were used
instead of toys. In the introduction phase, the owl again declared
that she likes her gems very much and would be very sad if her
gems would be gone and subsequently went to sleep. Then, the
experimenter put a box in front of the speaker puppet (e.g., the
lion) and an object (e.g., a spoon) on the table, and asked the
child to pay attention to what the speaker puppet was going to
say (“And now pay attention to what the lion will say. But he
must not say anything wrong! If he says something wrong, I will
take away all of the owl’s gems and put them in the lion’s box and
then the owl is very sad.”). When the experimenter had turned
around, the speaker puppet repeated: “Well, when I am saying
something wrong, [experimenter’s name] will take away all of the
owl’s gems and put them in my box and then the owl is very sad.”
In the bad intention condition, the puppet announced: “The owl
should not keep the gems. I want those gems. That’s why I want to
say something wrong.,” while announcing in the good-intention
condition: “The owl should keep the gems. I do not want those
gems. That’s why I want to say something right.”
In the test phase of both conditions, the speaker puppet
pointed on the object (e.g., spoon) and made an incorrect claim:
“I say this is an X (e.g., cat).” The experimenter then turned back
and corrected the lion (“This is an Y, not an X!”). The child was
asked to evaluate the lion’s claim for its moral valence on a Likert
scale (“The elephant said it wrong. Is this mean, a little mean,
good or very good of him?”) and to justify his/her evaluation.
After the evaluation trials, both speaker puppets (lion and
seal) who took part in the factual claim task came back. The
experimenter repeated the puppets’ intentions: “The lion wanted
to have the owl’s gems and therefore wanted to say something
wrong. And the seal did not want to have the owl’s gems and
therefore wanted to say something right. And then both said
something wrong. But who of the two is mean?” The child
had to choose one puppet and was asked to justify his/her
choice.
Coding and Reliability
All sessions were transcribed and coded from videotape by a
single observer. A second independent observer, blind to the
hypotheses and conditions of the study, transcribed and coded
a random sample of 25% of all sessions for reliability.
Children’s answers to the control questions (dichotomous
variable: correct or incorrect response to E1’s questions), their
rating on the Likert scale – from 1 (very good) to 4 (mean) –
and the justification of their rating were coded. Children’s
verbal responses were assigned to categories: (a) references to
the puppet’s intention (e.g., “Because he did it on purpose.,”
“Because he said he wants to say it right); (b) references to the
consequences (e.g., “Because now all gems are gone.,” “Because
then she [the owl] is sad.”); (c) references to the puppet’s action or
claim (e.g., “Because he did it wrong.,” “Because they are actually
scissors.”); (d) references to the ownership (e.g., “Because these
are the owl’s gems.”); (e) irrelevant justifications (e.g., “Because
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he has sharp teeth.”); or (f) no justifications (including “Don’t
know”).
Interrater reliability was very good, Cohen’s κ = 1 (both
answers to the control question 1 and 2), Cohen’s κ = 1 (warm-
up task evaluation), Cohen’s κ = 1 (warm-up task justification),
Cohen’s κ = 1 (factual claim task evaluation), Cohen’s κ = 1
(factual claim task justification), Cohen’s κ = 1 (forced-choice task
: “Who of the two is mean?”), Cohen’s κ = 1 (forced-choice task
justification).
Statistical Analysis
Statistical Analysis were run in R, version 3.4.2 (R Core Team,




In the factual claim task, children evaluated the puppet’s speech
act significantly more negatively when the puppet’s intention was
bad (M = 3.58, SD = 0.78) than when it was good (M = 3.42,
SD = 0.78; Z = −2.00, p = 0.046, r = −0.408). Figure 2 shows
the mean score of children’s evaluation of the puppet’s speech act.
Justifications
Children also had the opportunity to justify their evaluation.
Table 3 shows the frequencies of children’s justifications.
Relation between evaluation and justification
For the purposes of analyses, children were categorized as
“competent” (i.e., children who evaluated the puppet’s speech
act that was based on bad intentions more negatively than
when it was based on good intention) and “other” (i.e., did not
differentiate between the two conditions). As predicted, there
were significant associations between children’s justifications and
their competence in evaluating the moral valence of the puppet’s
speech act (see Table 4): bad intentions, χ2(2, N = 24) = 14.40,
p = 0.001, V = 0.775; good intentions, χ2(2, N = 24) = 11.88,
p = 0.002, V = 0.703, such that children who evaluated
the puppet’s speech act competently were more likely to give
justifications that referred to the puppet’s intentions (rather than
using other justification categories) than children who did not
differentiate between the two puppets. These children were more
likely to give justifications that referred to the consequences of
the speech act, irrelevant justifications or no justifications.
Forced-Choice Task
After the evaluation phase, children were asked to identify
the “mean” puppet. To test whether the proportion of
children choosing correctly the puppet with bad intentions
was significantly different from chance (0.50), we conducted a
planned exact binomial test (two-tailed). Children reliably chose
the puppet with bad intentions (88% of children, p < 0.001).
Furthermore, children were asked to justify their choice. Of
the children who correctly identified the ill-intended puppet
as the “mean” (German: “böse”) puppet, nine children (43%)
referred to the puppet’s bad intentions, three children (14%) to
the wrong speech act, two children (10%) to the consequences
in their justification, three children (14%) gave an irrelevant,
and four children (19%) gave no justification. Of the children
who incorrectly identified the well-intended puppet as the
“mean” puppet, one child referred to the puppet’s bad intentions
(33%), one child (33%) to the puppet’s good intentions in their
justification, and one child (33%) gave an irrelevant justification.
Warm-up Task
In the warm-up task, children answered two control questions to
make sure they understood the consequences of a wrong action
based on good or bad intentions. Only when the puppet had good
intentions, eight children gave an incorrect answer to the first
control question (“Did she do it right or wrong?,” correct answer
was “wrong”). When the puppet had bad intentions, one child
gave an incorrect answer to the second control question (“And
what will I do with the stickers?,” correct answer was “You put
them in the puppet’s box.”).
Evaluation
In the training phase, children evaluated the puppet’s action
marginally more negative when the puppet had bad intentions
(M = 3.62, SD = 0.71) than when she had good ones (M = 3.42,
SD = 0.78; Z =−1.67, p = 0.096., r =−0.340).
Justifications
See Table 3 for the frequencies of children’s justifications.
Relation between evaluation and justification
As predicted, there were significant associations between
children’s justifications and their competence in evaluating the
moral valence of the puppet’s action (see Table 4): bad intentions,
χ2(2, N = 24) = 14.29, p = 0.001, V = 0.772; good intentions,χ2(2,
N = 24) = 8.84, p = 0.012, V = 0.607, such that children who
evaluated the puppet’s action competently were more likely to
give justifications that referred to the puppet’s intentions (rather
than using other justification categories) than children who did
not differentiate between the two puppets or wrongly evaluated
the puppet’s action more negatively when it was based on good
than on bad intentions. These children were more likely to give
justifications that referred to the consequences of the action,
irrelevant justifications or no justifications.
Discussion
Children in this experiment evaluated the puppet’s factual
claim – which was always incorrect and would always lead
to harm – more negatively when the puppet intended the
harmful outcome (bad intention) than when the puppet did
not intend the harmful outcome (good intention). Moreover,
competent children (who evaluated the ill-intended speech act
more negatively than the well-intended one) were more likely to
give justifications that referred to the puppet’s intentions than to
the consequences of the assertive speech act, whereas the other
children (i.e., who did not distinguish between the two speech
acts) were more likely to give a justification that referred to the
consequences of the speech act, or, for instance, to the wrong
speech act itself than to the puppet’s intention. Furthermore,
children reliably chose the ill-intentioned puppet as being
the “mean” puppet. These findings suggest that preschoolers’
normative understanding of morally relevant assertions also
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FIGURE 2 | Mean score of children’s evaluation (from 0 = very good to 4 = mean). Error bars depict standard error of the mean.
TABLE 3 | Frequencies (percentage) of justifications.
Task
Categories Warm-up Factual claim
Bad intention Good intention Bad intention Good intention
Bad intention 5 (21%) 0 6 (25%) 1 (4%)
Good intention 0 4 (17%) 0 3 (12.5%)
Consequences 5 (21%) 4 (17%) 5 (21%) 5 (21%)
Action/speech act 10 (42%) 11 (46%) 10 (42%) 10 (42%)
Ownership 0 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%)
Others 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%)
No answer 3 (12%) 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 3 (12.5%)
TABLE 4 | Association evaluation and justification.
Justification category
Task Intention Intentions Consequences Others
Factual claim Bad Evaluation Others 2 5 13
Competent 4 0 0
Good Evaluation Others 1 5 14
Competent 3 0 1
Warm-up Bad Evaluation Others 1 4 14
Competent 4 1 0
Good Evaluation Others 1 4 14
Competent 3 0 2
entails an appreciation of the intentions underlying those speech
acts.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Much developmental research on children’s understanding of
normativity and morality focused on their evaluation of others’
intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal actions, such as hitting,
stealing, lying, or teasing. Verbal actions (e.g., assertions),
however, may have a moral dimension beyond epistemic
harm (e.g., lying) or psychological harm (e.g., teasing). For
instance, if someone makes an incorrect factual claim (e.g.,
“This water is clean!” or “The Earth is flat!”), this may
lead to harmful consequences to others. And the speaker
may even want those harmful consequences to occur and
therefore misuse the factual claim to reach an ill-intended
goal. We investigated children’s understanding of the moral
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dimension of factual claims. In two experiments, children
witnessed a speaker making an incorrect assertion (“This
is an X!”). In Experiment 1, we varied the speech act’s
consequences: it would either lead to harm (another puppet
would lose her property) or to no harm (a paper ball
would be thrown away). Children evaluated the incorrect
factual claim that would lead to harm more negatively
than the incorrect factual claim that would not lead to
any harm. In Experiment 2, the incorrect assertion would
always lead to harm (a puppet would lose her property).
However, we varied whether the puppet’s intention was good
(harmful consequences were not intended) or bad (harmful
consequences were intended). When the speaker was ill-
intended, children evaluated her claim more negatively than
when she was well-intentioned, although both claims would lead
to harmful consequences. Importantly, in neither experiment did
children witness morally relevant (non-verbal) actions in the
factual claim task, such as throwing away someone’s property.
Rather, they witnessed and evaluated morally relevant factual
claims that were related to upcoming consequences or prior
intentions.
These findings go beyond previous work on children’s
evaluation of, and reasoning about, others’ morally relevant
(non-)verbal actions (e.g., hitting, stealing, lying, and teasing)
in interview studies (Peterson et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983; Tisak
and Turiel, 1988; Bussey, 1992; Smetana, 2006; Smetana et al.,
2012) and children’s spontaneous protest responses to norm
transgressions in social interactions (Schmidt and Tomasello,
2012). In our study, children did not witness concrete harming
non-verbal actions, psychological harm or epistemic harm, but
rather factual claims (which, per se, need not be considered moral,
but rather correct or incorrect given observable reality; Turri,
2017) with moral relevance. Our findings also go beyond prior
work on preschoolers’ evaluation of speech acts which did not
involve a moral dimension, such as harm. For instance, 3-year-
olds were found to criticize speakers who make incorrect factual
claims (Rakoczy and Tomasello, 2009). In our experiments,
however, claims were always incorrect, and children had to
reason about the additional moral layer (consequences or
intentionality of consequences) when evaluating the factual
claims.
Moreover, in both experiments, competent children (i.e.,
in Experiment 1, children who evaluated the harm-related
speech act more negatively than the no harm-related one, and
in Experiment 2, children who evaluated the ill-intended speech
act more negatively than the well-intended one, respectively)
were more likely to use the appropriate justification type
(consequences in Experiment 1, intentions in Experiment
2) rather than other justification categories than the other
children (i.e., children who made the reverse evaluation
or no difference between the puppets’ speech acts). These
interrelations bolster the claim that children did not merely
evaluate the incorrect factual claim per se, but focused on
consequences and intentions, respectively. However, they also
suggest that while as a group, children were competent at
evaluating the factual claims in moral terms, there are also
substantial individual differences in children’s competence for
evaluation and justification that should be investigated in future
work. We should also note that Experiment 2, in particular,
was challenging regarding both the design [constant harm,
incorrect speech act, (un)intended consequences] and the
experimenter’s question which referred to the incorrectness
of the factual claim (“X said it wrong. Is this mean, a little
mean, good or very good of him?”). This might have led
some children to focus on whether the assertion matched
reality or not (thus not on moral questions). Similarly,
Nobes and colleagues (2016) found that the phrasing of the
experimenter’s question had a huge influence on children’s
moral evaluation, such as whether they focused on intention
or outcome. Moreover, the fact that the anticipated outcome
would always be harmful in Experiment 2 (actual harm
did not occur in the test phase) might in part explain why
children’s evaluation in Experiment 2 was overall rather
negative. Thus, future research could vary the intentionality
of consequences while keeping anticipated consequences
harmless.
The forced-choice test in Experiment 2 in which the clear
majority of children correctly identified the puppet with ill
intentions (and often referred to intentions in their reasoning)
as the “mean” one supports the notion that preschoolers
appreciate others’ intentions as morally relevant and use them for
making moral evaluations. Similarly, Killen et al. (2011) found
that from around late preschool age, children consider others’
intentions regarding morally relevant non-verbal actions in
which an accidental transgressor caused harm. Given that Killen
and colleagues found systematic associations between children’s
competence in false belief tasks and their moral evaluation of the
non-verbal actions, one interesting question for future research
is whether theory of mind skills and moral evaluation of verbal
actions – assertions underlain by good or bad intentions – are
related.
Together, the present findings suggest that preschoolers’
normative understanding is not only confined to evaluating
others’ intrinsically harmful (non-)verbal actions but also
entails an appreciation of the moral dimension of factual
claims that are typically merely true or false. And when
children evaluate factual claims regarding their moral worth,
they take into account consequences and intentions regarding
consequences. The current work thus broadens the investigation
of the ontogeny of normativity by integrating moral cognition
with children’s developing understanding of speech acts, such
as factual claims. Developing the ability to scrutinize and
evaluate factual claims with moral relevance is a crucial skill,
perhaps even more so in our digital age in which children
are confronted with assertions in virtual forums on a daily
basis.
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